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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first 
impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced 
between February 21, 2012 and August 28, 2012. This collection, written 
by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting 
point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 9 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2012). 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
In re Price, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a private cause of action is created pursuant to 
a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) and 18 U.S.C. § 3512, a statute 
governing foreign requests for assistance in criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.  Id. at 9. 
ANALYSIS: The court discussed the history and purpose of an 
MLAT, and explained the generally accepted view holds that a treaty 
does not create a private cause of action in domestic courts.  Id. at 10–11.  
“Express language in a treaty creating private rights can overcome this 
presumption,” but the court pointed out that this type of express language 
was absent in the MLAT.  Id. at 11.  Finally, the court discussed the 
propriety of a district court exercising discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3512 
in deciding not to quash a subpoena.  Id. at 14–15. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that an MLAT does not create a 
private cause of action in domestic courts absent express language in the 
treaty to that effect, and that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3512, a district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying relief based on a balancing of the 
interests involved.  Id. 
 
In re Puffer, 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “fee-only” plans in Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
cases are per se proffered in bad faith.  Id. at 79. 
ANALYSIS: The court pointed out that the “good faith” requirement 
for filing a Chapter 13 plan is derived directly from the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).  Id. at 81.  The court noted that there is no 
precise definition for the term “good faith.”  Id.  Next, the court referred 
to a prior decision in which it measured “good faith” by applying a 
totality of the circumstances test.  Id. at 81–82.  The court reasoned that a 
totality of the circumstances test should be “implied equally to inquiries 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1325,” in determining “good faith” for purposes of 
confirming a Chapter 13 plan.  Id. at 82.  The court cautioned against 
filing “fee-only” plans in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, but stated that 
“good faith” is an equitable concept, and, as such, it is “particularly 
insusceptible to per se rules.”  Id. at 82. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “fee-only” plans in Chapter 
13 bankruptcy cases are not per se proffered in bad faith.  Id. at 80. 
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Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 entitles a 
plaintiff to relief when “retaliation for his complaints about disability 
discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the but-for cause of, an 
adverse employment action.”  Id. at *1. 
ANALYSIS: The court held that “the Rehabilitation Act borrows the 
causation standard from the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA)” and applied that same standard in the case at bar.  Id. at *18.  
The court also considered whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 provided any guidance on how to resolve the present issue.  Id. at 
*13-14.  The court reasoned that the ADA’s but-for causation standard 
controls whether a defendant may be held liable for retaliation and stated, 
“[w]here, as here, that standard has not been satisfied, the Rehabilitation 
Act dictates that Title VII’s mixed-motive remedies do not pertain.”  Id. 
at *28.  
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 does not “entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for his 
complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but 
not the but-for cause of, an adverse employment action.”  Id. at *1. 
 
United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1 (1st Cir, 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “a conspiracy by law enforcement officers to 
plant controlled substances on victims in order to fabricate criminal cases 
. . . entail[s] the specific intent to distribute within the meaning of [21 
U.S.C.] § 841(a)(1).”  Id. at 16. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “distribute” is “defined 
broadly under § 841(a)(1),” and that the “defendants’ acts of transferring 
the drugs amongst each other and to the victims constitutes an intent to 
distribute the drugs under § 841(a)(1).”  Id. at 18.  The court further 
stressed that “[t]here is no language anywhere in the statute which 
supports defendants’ argument of non-coverage.”  Id.  The court 
emphasized that Congress made a “deliberate choice not to restrict § 
841.”  Id. at 19.  Moreover, the court explained that “[t]he underlying 
goal of the distribution is, under the plain language of the statute, 
irrelevant to the question of whether there was a ‘distribution.’”  Id.  
Looking at congressional intent, the court observed that “Congress was 
well aware of the question of legitimate handling of drugs, for it carved 
out exceptions, but those exceptions do not include the activities in 
which these defendants engaged.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “both the language and the intent 
of § 841(a)(1) is such that it applies” to a “conspiracy by law 
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enforcement officers to plant controlled substances on victims in order to 
fabricate criminal cases . . . .”  Id. at 23, 16. 
 
 
United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an order to pay restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 
2259 to a victim of child pornography satisfied the requisite statutory 
requirements.  Id. at 91. 
ANALYSIS: The court addressed whether “Congress was careful to 
specify some definitions of recoverable losses [in § 2259] where it had 
not done so in other restitution statutes.”  Id. at 92.  The court then 
examined § 2259 and addressed three specific sub-issues raised by the 
restitution claim: “(1) the requirements for an individual to be considered 
a ‘victim’ within the meaning of § 2259 (c); (2) the causation 
requirement applicable to determining which costs incurred by the victim 
[in § 2259(b)(3)] are compensable; (3) . . . whether the district court 
made a reasonable determination of [the restitution amount].”  Id. at 93 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the restitution awarded to 
the victim of child pornography met the statutory requirements of § 
2259.  Id. at 101. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the five-year time limitation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1256(a), a statute governing the rescission of the adjustment status of 
an alien and its effect upon naturalization, applies to aliens “who 
acquired lawful permanent resident status through consular processing 
rather than an action of the Attorney General.”  Id. at 96. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the text, structure, and legislative 
history of § 1256(a) and concluded that Congress’ reference to a five-
year time period “after the status of a person has otherwise been 
adjusted” only “refers to a change in the existing immigration status of 
an alien already in the United States.”  Id. at 97.  This phrase does not 
apply to consular proceedings, the court reasoned, because they create a 
status relationship with the country as opposed to adjusting an already 
existing status, as is required by § 1256(a).  Id.  The court explained that 
the Attorney General has the power to adjust or revoke the status of an 
alien already in the country, whereas the Department of State and the 
Secretary of State bear the power to grant or revoke an immigrant visa 
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through consular proceedings that take place outside of the country.  Id. 
at 98–99.  The court found support for this interpretation in the text, 
structure, and legislative history of § 1256(a).  Id. at 99–100. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that when Congress, under § 
1256(a), “authorized the Attorney General, for a period up to five years, 
to rescind an alien’s adjustment of status, it was authorizing rescission 
only of a prior decision by the Attorney General to change the status of 
an alien already in the United States to that of a lawful permanent 
resident,” and did not intend for the five-year limitation to apply to a 
status granted through consular proceedings.  Id. at 101. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether the five-year time limitation of 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1256(a) applies “not only to the Attorney General’s power of 
rescission, but also to his power of removal.”  Id. at *10–11. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the language of § 1256(a) and noted 
that it specifically authorized the Attorney General to “rescind the 
adjusted status, and nothing more,” but does not indicate that subsequent 
actions are subject to a time limitation or make any mention of removal.  
Id. at 96.  The court reasoned that merely because rescission is a lesser 
consequence than removal, it does not imply that Congress intended to 
impose the five-year limitation on removal as well.  Id. at 104–05.  
Furthermore, the court stated that narrowly interpreting the scope of the 
time limitation did not effectively eliminate the limitation, and pointed 
out that since the consequences of rescission are less severe than 
removal, “the Attorney General need not afford the same procedural 
safeguards to an alien facing rescission as must be provided to an alien 
facing removal.”  Id. at 105.  Finally, the court explained that this 
interpretation was proper under a Chevron analysis, and that the rule of 
lenity did not apply since there was enough evidence in the text, 
structure, and legislative history of § 1256(a) to support such an 
interpretation.  Id. at 107. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that § 1256(a)’s five-year 
limitations period does not apply to removal orders.  Id. at 101. 
 
Brault v. SSA, 683 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is 
required to expressly state his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s 
challenged testimony.  Id. at 443. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[a]n ALJ does not have to 
state on the record every reason justifying a decision.”  Id. at 448.  The 
court referenced the 8th Circuit’s finding that “[a]lthough required to 
develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss 
every piece of evidence submitted.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation 
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marks omitted) The court further noted that “[a]n ALJ’s failure to cite 
specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not 
considered.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that assuming the ALJ 
considered the objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, “[t]here is 
no requirement that the ALJ discuss his specific analysis of it.” Id. at 
448. 
 
Cage v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 09-4530-cv, 2012 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 17371 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2012) 
QUESTION: Who bears the burden of proof with respect to whether 
the claimant’s drug addiction or alcoholism (DAA) was a contributing 
factor material to the determination of disability in an application for 
Supplemental Security Income benefits?  Id. at 123. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the Contract with America 
Advancement Act (CAAA) amended the Social Security Act (SAA) to 
provide that “an individual shall not be considered disabled if alcoholism 
or drug addiction would be a contributing factor material to the 
Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  While “the CAAA does not specify 
who bears the burden of proof on DAA materiality . . . all of the other 
circuit courts that have considered this question have held that the 
claimant bears the burden of proving that her DAA is not material to the 
determination that she is disabled.”  Id.  The court proffered four reasons 
supporting the “weight of the authority that claimants bear the burden of 
proving DAA immateriality.”  Id.  First, the amended definition of 
“disabled” excluded conditions materially caused by DAA.  Id. at 123–
24.  Second, a claimant was “better positioned than the SSA to offer 
proof as to the relevance of any DAA to . . . [his or her] disability 
determinations because facts relevant to those determinations ordinarily 
would be in . . . [his or her] possession.”  Id. at 124.  Third, the court 
pointed out that “holding claimants to this burden accords with the 
Congressional purpose in enacting the CAA.”  Id.  Finally, the court 
found that long-standing precedents from other circuits counseled in 
favor of placing the burden on the claimant.  Id. at 124–25. 
CONCLUSION: The Second Circuit concluded “that claimants bear 
the burden of proving DAA immateriality.”  Id. at 123. 
 
Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether witness tampering is an “offense relating to 
the obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), as it is 
interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  Id. at 100. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he [Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA)] defines the term ‘aggravated felony’ to include . . 
. ‘an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of 
perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at 
least one year.’”  Id. at 100 (internal citation omitted).  The court also 
noted that the BIA interpreted obstruction of justice offenses as those 
“interfere[ing] with the proceedings of a tribunal or requir[ing] an intent 
to harm or retaliate against others who cooperate in the process of justice 
or might otherwise so cooperate.”  Id. at 101.  The court reasoned that 
although there was a circuit split over how much deference to give to the 
BIA’s interpretation, it adopted the BIA’s broader “categorical approach 
that looks to the elements of the penal statute rather than the particulars 
of the alien’s conduct,” since witness tampering fell within even the most 
restrictive view articulated by the 3rd Circuit.  Id. at 104.  The court, 
accordingly, posited that a conviction of witness tampering required an 
actus reus of “induc[ing] or attempt[ing] to induce a witness to testify 
falsely . . . [or] withhold testimony,” and a mens rea of “belie[f] that an 
official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted.”  Id. at 104. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that witness tampering 
constituted “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, since it . . . 
included as elements both (1) the actus reus of an active interference with 
proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action 
against those who would cooperate in the process of justice, and (2) the 
mens rea of a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice.”  Id. 
at 102 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a private animal-rescue organization and 
its employees and agents act under color of state law for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 when they perform surgery on seized pets against the 
owner’s wishes or without the owner’s knowledge.”  Id. at *27. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[b]ecause the United States 
Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant 
claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first 
establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.”  Id. at 
*29–30 (internal citation omitted).  “[S]tate action requires both an 
alleged constitutional deprivation caused by the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the 
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and that the party 
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to 
be a state actor.”  Id. at *30 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Specifically, “there must be such a close nexus between the 
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[s]tate and the challenged action that the state is responsible for the 
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”  Id. at *31 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  The test the court adopted to 
determine “whether a private entity acts under color of state law for 
purposes of § 1983 [began] by identifying the specific conduct of which 
the plaintiff complains, rather than the general characteristics of the 
entity.”  Id. at *32 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  The 
court determined that “[t]he spaying and neutering of the dogs, like the 
search and arrest, constituted state action because they were part of the 
state function of animal control delegated to the SPCA by state law.”  Id. 
at *34.  “[W]hen the SPCA, operating under the delegated animal-control 
authority provided by New York’s Agriculture and Markets Law, seizes 
animals from their owners and then sterilizes them, it acts under color of 
state law because it performs an exclusively public function that has been 
delegated to it by the state.”  Id. at *42. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that private animal-rescue 
organizations, such as the SPCA, that are delegated the authority to 
perform animal control by a municipality “are state actors for purposes 
of § 1983 when they perform surgery on animals in their care while those 
animals are being kept from their owners by the authority of the state, 
following searches and seizures carried out by the agencies pursuant to 
warrants.”  Id. at *45. 
 
Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION ONE: “[W]hether the notice requirements of 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 
1229(a)(1), are satisfied by service of a Notice to Appear that indicates 
that the date and time of the hearing will be set in the future, followed by 
service of a separate notice specifying the precise date and time of the 
hearing . . . .”  Id. at 405. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that aliens may establish their 
eligibility for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal if they can 
demonstrate that they were physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of ten years immediately prior to the date of the 
application.  Id. at 409.  The 2nd Circuit adopted the rationale of the 7th 
circuit, which “held that the notice requirements of § 239(a)(1) may be 
satisfied by a combination of documents that, jointly, provide the specific 
notice required by the statute.”  Id. at 409-10. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “service of a Notice to 
Appear that (alone or in combination with a subsequent notice) provides 
the notice required by § 239(a)(1)” satisfied the notice requirement of 
INA § 239(a)(1).  Id. at 410. 
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QUESTION TWO: Whether notice under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) “triggers the 
‘stop-time rule’ of INA § 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A), 
notwithstanding any defect in service of subsequent notices of change in 
the time or place of the hearing under INA § 239(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 
1229(a)(2).”  Id. at 405. 
ANALYSIS: The court had previously decided that “service of a 
Notice to Appear that (alone or in combination with a subsequent notice) 
provides the notice required by § 239(a)(1).”  Id. at 410.  The court stated 
that the stop-time rule “specifies that the time of accrual of physical 
presence ‘shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served with a 
notice to appear.’”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that the stop-time rule is 
triggered upon service of a Notice to Appear that (alone or in 
combination with a subsequent notice) provides the notice required by § 
239(a)(1), notwithstanding any imperfections in the service of 
subsequent notices of changes in the time or place of a hearing under § 
239(a)(2).”  Id. 
 
In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 673 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2012) 
 QUESTION: Whether, in considering a tort claim against a debtor 
in bankruptcy, the choice of law rules of the state in which the 
bankruptcy proceeding is taking place should apply or whether the 
choice of law rules of the state in which the complaint was filed, where 
that filing precedes the bankruptcy petition, should govern.  Id. at 190. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed Supreme Court and 2nd Circuit 
precedent regarding the requirement that the bankruptcy forum’s choice 
of law rules govern, which it held was intended to prevent forum 
shopping.  Id. at 188–89.  The Second Circuit then distinguished those 
cases from the present case based on the fact that the plaintiff had 
commenced the litigation prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, and 
thus, “did not choose to litigate in [the forum state].”  Id. at 190.  The 
court reasoned that “it would be fundamentally unfair to allow [the 
debtor’s] bankruptcy, coming as it did in the midst of the [tort] action, to 
deprive [the plaintff] of the state-law advantages adhering to the exercise 
of its venue privilege.”  Id.  The court further noted that “[t]o hold 
otherwise would be to allow the defendant  [debtor] to use a device of 
federal law (the bankruptcy code) to choose the forum and 
accompanying choice of law—a practice forbidden by [Supreme Court 
precedent],” and also would “lead to the ironic result that [the forum 
state’s] anti-forum shopping [statute] would be applied to defeat the 
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claim of a party that did not shop for [the state] as a forum.  Id. at 190–
91. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the choice of law rules of 
the state where the underlying prepetition claim was filed should be 
applied in a federal bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. at 182. 
 
Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
and for purposes of determining whether an employee is eligible for an 
executive exemption from the FLSA’s overtime-pay protections, “a 
[work] unit can have ‘a permanent status and a continuing function’ 
when it is functionally identical to other [work] units, when it works the 
same shift as other units, and when it operates in the same physical space 
as other units.”  Id. at 561. 
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized that the illustrative list of 
subdivisions provided by the Department of Labor was not intended to 
restrict the categorization of work units to just those “that perform 
distinct tasks or are otherwise distinguishable by some ‘specific 
standard,’” because that requirement is not stated in the regulatory text.  
Id. at 562.  The court observed that neither the Department of Labor nor 
any other circuit had adopted such a construction of the regulation.  Id.  
The court then cited case law from various jurisdictions indicating that 
no court had construed a uniqueness determination to the exemption.  Id. 
at 562–63.  Recognizing a trend in the case law, the court stated that 
“[w]hile operating in different locations, working different shifts, or 
performing distinct functions from other teams are certainly factors that 
can support the conclusion that a team of employees constitutes a 
customarily recognized department or subdivision,” it had not found any 
case “that goes so far as to require one of those specific types of 
distinguishability as a matter of law.”  Id. at 563.  The court added that 
neither the Department’s interpretations nor the scant legislative history 
of the FLSA’s executive exemption support such a reading.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the second element of the 
executive exemption to the FLSA overtime-pay rule, 29 C.F.R. § 
541.100(a)(2), does not require that units within the workplace have 
uniqueness of functionality, location, or time.  Id. at 564. 
 
Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “Whether recourse to the pattern-or-practice 
evidentiary framework is appropriate in a suit against individual state 
officials brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for intentional 
discrimination.”  Id. at 197. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first noted that equal protection claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must evidence discriminatory intent and 
cannot be based solely on facially neutral policies with disproportionate 
adverse impact on minorities.   Id. at 201.  Next, the court determined 
that, although “Title VII’s core substantive standards are also applicable 
to employment discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause,” Title VII’s pattern-or-practice burden-shifting framework could 
not be applied in analyzing discrimination claims brought against 
individual state officials pursuant to § 1983.  Id. at 202.  The court 
reasoned that “the pattern-or-practice framework is ill-suited in 
identifying which individual defendants engaged in purposeful 
discrimination” because “[s]tatistics proffered during the ‘liability phase’ 
of a pattern-or-practice suit purport to demonstrate that a pattern of 
discrimination exists at an entity.  Id. at 204.  The court further reasoned 
that statistics showing entity-level discrimination are insufficient to 
establish that a particular individual defendant engaged in intentional 
discrimination.  Id.  Finally, the court noted that using the “pattern-or-
practice framework in the Equal Protection context would substantially 
circumvent the petitioner’s obligation to raise a prima facie inference of 
individual discriminatory intent.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the pattern-or-practice 
evidentiary framework was not appropriate to establish liability in a suit 
against individual defendants.  Id. at 205. 
 
United States v. Esso, 684 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant is denied the constitutional right 
to a fair trial where a “district court allow[s] the jury to take home the 
copy of the indictment that ha[s] already been provided for use in the 
jury room.”  Id. at 350. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit acknowledged that “the jury system is 
meant to involve decision making as a collective, deliberative process.”  
Id. at 351. The court, however, rejected “the argument that permitting the 
jury to take the indictment home was in error merely because it might 
lead jurors to form ideas about the case by themselves.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Such private deliberations . . . may in fact 
enable jurors to participate more thoughtfully in the collective process of 
reaching a verdict.”  Id.  On the other hand, the court expressed its 
“doubts about the wisdom of the practice,” because “[s]ending trial 
materials home with jurors increases the chance of exposing the jury to 
outside influences” and of “overemphasiz[ing] its significance, since it is 
a one-sided presentation of the prosecution’s view of the case.”  Id. at 
351–52.  Since the district court provided “clear and emphatic limiting 
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instructions,” however, the 2nd Circuit did not find that this practice 
constituted trial error.  Id. at 352.  This decision is “consistent with cases 
allowing jurors to take home copies of jury instructions,” and with the 
notion that trial judges should be accorded “great discretion . . . to 
manage their own courtrooms.”  Id. at 352–53, 354. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “so long as jury 
deliberations have begun and appropriate cautionary instructions are 
provided, permitting the jury to take the indictment home overnight does 
not deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”  Id. at 350–51. 
 
Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the common law willful blindness doctrine 
applies in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) context.  Id. at 
34–35. 
ANALYSIS: The court previously held in the trademark 
infringement context that “[w]hen [a service provider] has reason to 
suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected mark, it may 
not shield itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by 
looking the other way.”  Id. at 35 (internal quotations marks omitted).  
The court reasoned that, “[b]ecause the statute does not speak directly to 
the willful blindness doctrine, § 512(m) limits–but does not abrogate–the 
doctrine.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Since the willful 
blindness doctrine is not abrogated by § 512, a fact finder must 
determine “whether the defendant made a deliberate effort to avoid guilty 
knowledge . . .” in the DMCA context.  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the willful blindness 
doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate 
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the 
DMCA.”  Id. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether, after a plan administrator distributes a 
deceased participant’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) governed 401(k) funds to the designated beneficiary, the estate 
of the decedent can sue the designated beneficiary to recover the funds 
when the designated beneficiary has previously waived her right to those 
funds pursuant to a divorce decree.  Id. at 132. 
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ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, 
considering a “virtually identical” case, held that a plan administrator 
correctly fulfills its statutory duty by paying the benefits to the ex-wife in 
accordance with plan documents.  Id. at 133.  The Supreme Court has 
remained silent on whether an estate can sue the ex-wife to recover the 
distributed benefits.  Id. at 133–34.  The 3rd Circuit stated that several 
state appellate courts have permitted a decedent’s estate to bring a post-
distribution suit against the decedent’s ex-wife to enforce her waiver and 
found that the same applied in the instant case.  Id. at 137–39. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the decedent’s estate can 
sue the decedent’s ex-wife to enforce a waiver made pursuant to a 
divorce decree and thereby can recover the disputed ERISA governed 
401(k) funds.  Id. at 132. 
 
United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an application of a sentencing enhancement 
by a district court under § 2C1.2(b)(3) should be reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion, clear error, or de novo standard of review.  Id. at 218. 
ANALYSIS: The court first established that “a more deferential 
standard of review is appropriate where . . . [it considers] a district 
court’s application of the Guidelines to a specific set of facts . . . .”  Id. at 
219.  The court declined to apply de novo review and stated that the 
abuse of discretion test “does not fit as well with the inquiry . . . .”  Id. at 
223 (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the court, “[c]lear 
error review is appropriate when the legal issue decided by the district 
court is, in essence, a factual question.”  Id. at 220.  The court explained 
that the “factual nature of the determination favors the trial court’s 
experience and first-hand observation of testimony and other evidence.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the clearly erroneous 
standard is appropriate when reviewing a district court’s determination 
that the enhancement under § 2C1.2(b)(3) applies based on the facts 
presented.”  Id. at 216. 
 
United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), “which governs the 
modification and revocation of supervised release following 
imprisonment,” is subject to the aggregate limit of subsection § 3583(h), 
which “concerns the term of supervised release that may be imposed 
following a term of post-revocation imprisonment.”  Id. at 278. 
ANALYSIS: The court first considered the Appellant’s interpretation 
of § 3583, “that, since the authorized term of supervised release is 
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reduced by the amount of prison time a defendant served for previous 
release violations, the maximum term of post-revocation imprisonment 
under subsection (e)(3) is likewise progressively reduced.”  Id. at 279.  
The court rejected this interpretation and reasoned that subsection (e) 
“unambiguously sets the maximum prison sentence by reference to the 
length of supervised release statutorily authorized for the conviction 
offense, not for the length of supervised release authorized after a 
revocation imprisonment.”  Id.  The court rejected the argument that the 
language “term of supervised release authorized by statute” contained in 
subsection (e)(3), “itself imposes an aggregate limit on post-revocation 
imprisonment.”  Id.  The court explained that “[s]ubsection (e)(3) refers 
to the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in such term of supervised release.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “subsection (e)(3) is not 
subject to the aggregate limit of subsection (h)” because “[s]ubsection 
(e)(3) clearly fixes the term of post-revocation imprisonment according 
to the former, and gives no indication that the aggregate limit of 
supervised release time under subsection (h) applies as well to the term 
of imprisonment that may be imposed when supervised release is 
revoked.”  Id. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, in light of the 2005 amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (“the Code”), codified by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 11 Stat. 23 (2005), the absolute priority rule continues 
to apply to individual debtors in possession proceeding under Chapter 
11.”  Id. at 560. 
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit noted that after the 2005 amendments, 
bankruptcy courts have split on whether Congress intended the 
abrogation of the absolute priority rule.  Id. at 563.  The court explained 
that such courts either adopted the “broad view,” that Congress intended 
abrogation, or the “narrow view,” that Congress did not intend such a 
sweeping change to Chapter 11.  Id.  The court reasoned that the 
language of the BAPCPA amendment is too ambiguous to simply apply 
its plain meaning.  Instead, the court looked at the specific and broader 
context within which Congress enacted the statute, reasoning that 
BAPCA § 1115, which amended § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code, 
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“add[ed] to the property of the estate of an individual post-petition 
acquired property and earnings[, and] [w]ithout a corresponding change 
to § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), individual debtors could no longer retain post-
petition acquired property and earnings if they wished to ‘cram down’ a 
plan.”  Id. at 569–70.  The court further reasoned that, particularly in 
light of the Supreme Court’s strong disfavoring of implied repeal in the 
bankruptcy context, “if Congress had intended to abrogate such a well-
established rule of bankruptcy jurisprudence, it could have done so in a 
far less convoluted manner.”  Id. at 570–71.  The court also posited that 
there is no indication in the BAPCPA’s legislative history that suggests 
Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority rule.  Id. at 572. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held “that the absolute priority 
rule as it applies to individual debtors in Chapter 11 has not been 
abrogated by the BAPCPA.”  Id. at 574. 
 
Johnson v. Zimmer, 686 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: How the “household” size of a debtor seeking 
bankruptcy relief is to be calculated under Chapter 13, in light of the 
2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (“the 
Code”), codified by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).  Id. at 
225. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the term “household” is not 
defined under the Bankruptcy Code.  Id. at 231.  The court determined 
that the dictionary definition of the term household does not resolve the 
matter because it has “multiple definitions of varying scope and 
consequence.”  Id. at 232.  The court next analyzed the term in light of 
words surrounding it in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) and determined that 
reading “household” in context with the other terms in the Code does not 
resolve the uncertainty because different terms are used around the term 
in cross-referenced Code provisions.  Id. at 233.  The court rejected the 
“heads-on-beds” approach since it allows debtors to “broadly define their 
‘households’ so as to include individuals who have no actual financial 
impact on the debtor’s expenses.”  Id. at 236.  Additionally, the court 
rejected an income tax dependent method as underinclusive.  Id. at 239.  
Finally, the court determined that using an “economic unit” approach, 
which examines the economic interdependence of individuals to 
determine whether someone is an economic part of a household, is 
correct because it is consistent with § 1325(b), the BAPCPA and the 
Code as a whole.  Id. at 237–38.  The court reasoned that “Congress’ 
intent will most often be best implemented through a definition of 
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‘household’ that is based on whether individuals operate as a single 
economic unit and are financially interdependent.”  Id. at 242. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the economic unit 
approach is appropriate to determine a debtor’s household size.  Id. 
 
United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [a] juror’s use of Wikipedia create[s] a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice.”  Id. at 641. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that, in Remmer v. United States, 
347 U.S. 227 (1954), the Supreme Court found a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice arising in third party unauthorized communications with a 
juror during the course of a trial.  Id. at 641.  Remmer, however, did not 
“resolve the question whether the presumption is applicable in cases 
involving a juror’s unauthorized use of Wikipedia.”  Id. at 644.  Initially, 
the court recognized that unauthorized third party contact has a different 
nature “than a juror’s unauthorized use of a dictionary during jury 
deliberations.”  Id.  After further examining the application of Remmer in 
the 4th Circuit, the court observed that in both situations, “a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is at issue,” thus threatening “the 
sanctity of the jury and its deliberations” beyond the court’s ability to 
control.  Id. at 646. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the presumption as applied 
in Remmer “is applicable when a juror uses a dictionary or similar 
resource to research the definition of a material word or term at issue in a 
pending case.”  Id. at 645. 
 
United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2012)  
QUESTION: Whether “a defendant in a criminal case may be tried 
by an anonymous jury.”  Id. at *23. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that the decision to empanel an 
anonymous jury is subject to review for abuse of discretion.  Id. at *28.  
The court noted that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3432, a district court should 
base its decision on a preponderance of the evidence standard to avoid 
appellate review for abuse of discretion.  Id. at *35.   The court also 
noted that a district court must take “reasonable precautions” to protect 
defendants’ rights.  Id. at *48. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a district court may 
empanel an anonymous jury.  Id. at *78. 
 
United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the government “describing a defendant as a 
‘liar’ is per se improper.”  Id. at 358. 
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ANALYSIS: The court stated that while the 4th Circuit had not 
determined this issue, several other circuits have addressed it.  Id.  The 
9th Circuit permitted such a description of a defendant when the 
evidence provided reasonable inferences, and the 7th Circuit found “no 
undue prejudice from labeling ‘the teller of [a] falsity a liar.’”  Id.  The 
8th Circuit allowed the description so long as the prosecutor argued 
about the evidence.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit permitted the government’s 
remarks about a defendant so long as they were “not excessive or 
inflammatory.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit joined the 2nd, 7th, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits in holding that it is not improper for the government to describe 
a defendant as a “liar.”  Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
Chilton v. Moser (In re Chilton), 674 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an inherited Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) satisfies the requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and is exempt from the bankruptcy estate.  Id. at 488. 
ANALYSIS: The Court first addressed whether inherited IRAs are 
“retirement funds” under § 522(d)(12) since the phrase is not defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Id.   The 5th Circuit noted that most courts have 
concluded that inherited IRAs are “retirement funds” as “the statute does 
not explicitly limit ‘retirement funds’ to retirement funds that belong to 
the debtor.”  Id. at 489.  The court also noted that other courts “have 
reasoned that ‘retirement funds’ can include the funds that others had 
originally set aside for their retirement, as with inherited IRAs.”  Id.  The 
court next addressed whether the funds in an inherited IRA are “in a fund 
or account that is exempt from taxation” under the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986.  Id.  The court observed that other courts have reasoned 
that inherited IRAs are exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 408(e), 
which exempts “any individual retirement account” from taxation.  Id. at 
490.  Lastly, the court recognized that “the definition of individual 
retirement accounts in the Internal Revenue Code encompasses inherited 
IRAs.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that inherited IRAs are 
“retirement funds” and are exempt from taxation, satisfying the two 
requirements of § 522(d)(12).  Id. 
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Little v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., 690 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether the False Claims Act’s (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730 (2006), “‘public disclosure bar’ is an impediment” to qui tam 
actions.”  Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, if there was a public 
disclosure, then “whether the relator was an original source for the 
information” becomes an important consideration.  Id. at 294.  When 
determining whether a relator is the original source, the court must 
consider whether a relator had “‘direct and independent knowledge’ of 
the allegations underlying his complaint, and also [had] ‘voluntarily 
provided the information to the Government.’”  Id. (quoting § 
3730(e)(4)).  The 5th Circuit reasoned that “the fact that a relator was 
employed specifically to disclose fraud is sufficient to render his 
disclosures nonvoluntary.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that, if there is a public 
disclosure, then a qui tam action is barred because “relators cannot be the 
original source.”  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a federal employee is the “person under 
the [FCA] such that he may maintain a qui tam action.”  Id. at 283. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under the text of the FCA, “‘[a] 
person’ may bring suit, suggesting that any person may do so.”  Id. at 
286 (quoting § 3730(b)(1)).  The court also noted that “the Supreme 
Court embraced a presumption that the statutory term extends to persons 
politic and incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.”  Id. at 286–87 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The 5th Circuit also reasoned that “a 
person can have two legal identities, one official and one individual.”  Id.  
at 288. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a federal employee is a 
“person” under the FCA.  Id. at 289. 
 
Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an alien’s petition for cancellation of removal 
is eligible for consideration pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) where 
the crime precipitating the deportation occurred more than five years 
after the admission into the United States.  Id. at 696. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he Attorney General may 
cancel the removal of an alien who is deportable if the alien, among other 
requirements, ‘has not been convicted of an offense under section 
1227(a)(2) of [title 8].’”  Id. (quoting § 1229b(b)(1)(C)).  According to 
the court, the parties “dispute[d] whether ‘under’ in Section 
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1229b(b)(1)(C) references only the crime or refers also to the 
requirement it be committed within five years after admission.”  Id.  The 
court explained that the defendant’s interpretation of “under,” which was 
derived from a D.C. Circuit case interpreting another statute, was 
erroneous.  Id. at 697.  The court determined that “it is not possible to be 
convicted under the referenced immigration statute as it only refers to 
categories of offenses that are criminalized by other statutes.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that for purposes of 
determining whether an alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal, “it 
does not matter when the offense occurred in relation to the alien’s 
admission.”  Id. at 697–98. 
 
United States v. Asencio-Perdomo, 674 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the definition of aggravated felony in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)  “refers to an offense’s statutory minimum term of 
imprisonment or the actual sentence imposed on a particular defendant.”  
Id. at 446. 
ANALYSIS: The court cited the statute as defining “aggravated 
felony . . . [as] a theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment 
[sic] at least one year.”  Id.  The court cited another section of the statute, 
which defines “term of imprisonment” as “the period of incarceration or 
confinement ordered by a court” rather than the possible minimum or 
maximum prison sentence available upon conviction.  Id. at 446-47.  The 
court reasoned that while it may be “superficial[ly] plausible” to exempt 
from the definition of “aggravated felony” offenses which provide for a 
minimum prison sentence of less than a year , it “reads this language 
straightforwardly.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a plain reading of the 
statute demonstrates that the phrase “term of imprisonment . . . refers to 
the actual sentence imposed.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether criminal penalties for “negligent violations” 
of permit conditions imposed by 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(A) are 
sustainable only with proof of gross negligence or if ordinary negligence 
is sufficient to maintain convictions.  Id. at 241–42. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that courts applying criminal laws 
must start their analysis with the language of the statute.  Id. at 242.  The 
court noted that the statute “refers explicitly to ‘negligent’ violations.”  
Id.  The court opined that negligence is an unambiguous concept that 
indicated a failure to act like a reasonably prudent person in similar 
situations.  Id.  The court therefore found that the statute’s plain and 
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unambiguous language indicated an intent to impose liability based on 
ordinary negligence.  Id. The court further noted that it found no 
“contrary intentions in the statute’s legislative history.”  Id. Finally, the 
court concluded that a decision holding that ordinary negligence is 
sufficient was consistent with its interpretation of other criminal statutes 
requiring “negligence.”  Id. at 242–43. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the government need 
only prove ordinary negligence to support convictions for misdemeanor 
“negligent violations” under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(A).  Id. at 242. 
 
United States v. Solis, 675 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2012)  
QUESTION: Whether U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.31, 
amended by 18 U.S.C. app. C, Amend 651 (Amendment 651), “which 
requires that downward departures in criminal history are not to be 
considered when evaluating safety valve eligibility,” is a substantive 
change or a clarifying amendment to the 2002 Edition of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.  Id. at 797. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2), “courts are required to consider 
subsequent amendments ‘to the extent that such amendments are 
clarifying rather than substantive changes.’”  Id. at 797.  The court 
observed that most of the cases interpreting this provision have addressed 
instances of post-sentencing amendments to the guidelines.  Id. at 797–
98.  The court explained that Amendment 651 “made substantial textual 
revisions” to the sentencing guidelines.  Id. at 799.  The court noted that 
“[t]he Sentencing Commission did expressly state that Amendment 651 
is a clarifying amendment, and Amendment 651 is not listed in the 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) as being retroactively applicable.”  Id. The 5th 
Circuit noted there is generally requires that there be “an express 
acknowledgement that the amendment is clarifying,” which Amendment 
651 lacked.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that Amendment 651 is not a 
clarifying amendment.  Id. at 799–800. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
Doe v. Salvation Army in United States, 685 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether religious organizations can be “principally 
engaged” in “social services” under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or 
whether religious organizations must be excluded.  Id. at 565. 
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ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit employed “a three-step framework to 
interpret the scope of the statute: first, a natural reading of the full text; 
second, the common-law meaning of the statutory terms; and finally, 
consideration of the statutory and legislative history for guidance.”  Id.  
at 569.  The court first determined that “a natural reading of the statute 
does not explicitly include or exclude religious organizations” and the 
services that private entities must provide to qualify “do not appear 
implicitly to exclude religious organizations . . . .”  Id. at 570.  The court 
then looked at the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “social services,” 
which states that it is an “activity designed to promote social well-
being.”  Id.  The court stated that “the provision of social services may be 
a form of religious worship, but that makes it no less the provision of 
social services.”  Id. at 570–71.  The court then analyzed the meaning of 
the phrase “principally engaged,” which it stated had been interpreted in 
other statutory contexts as “referring to the primary activities of a 
business, excluding only incidental activities.”  Id. at 571.  The court 
determined that a corporation of any kind, religious or not, can be 
principally engaged in providing social services if it primarily takes part 
in matters promoting social well being.  Id.  The court stated that there 
was “virtually nothing” in the statutory and legislative history “that 
suggests that Congress intended to exclude all religious organizations 
from § 504.  Id.  Additionally, the court pointed out that other statutes 
provide express exceptions for religious organizations.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that religious organizations 
could be principally engaged in social services within the meaning of § 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. 
 
Ellington v. City of East Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the “legislative employee” exclusion to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) operates to exempt a city council 
deputy clerk from the Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions.  Id. 
at 552. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “individuals who work for a state 
or a political subdivision thereof are not employees under the Act if they 
. . . fall within one of the enumerated exclusions established by 
Congress.”  Id. at 553.  The court reasoned that individuals “employed 
by the legislative branch or body of a political subdivision” are excluded 
from coverage.  Id.  The court further reasoned that an employment 
relationship sufficient to render the city an “employer” within the 
meaning of the FLSA exists where the city council has “substantial 
authority to hire and fire” a deputy clerk, where the city counsel 
“tirelessly work[s] to ensure that he [i]s compensated for his services,” 
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and its members directly assign the clerk jobs that directly correspond to 
council’s activities.  Id. at 555. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that, where the city council has 
“substantial involvement” in the clerk’s employment, a deputy clerk for a 
city council falls under the “legislative employee” exception to the FLSA 
and thus, is not entitled to minimum wages and overtime pay under the 
FLSA.  Id. at 556. 
 
Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Authority, 691 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION: Whether employer-ordered psychological counseling 
constitutes a “medical examination” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).  Id. at 814. 
ANALYSIS: The court first observed that § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the 
ADA “prohibits employers from requiring a medical examination or 
making inquiries of an employee as to whether such an employee is an 
individual with a disability unless such examination or inquiry is shown 
to be job related and consistent with business necessity.”  Id. at 815 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Noting that “[t]he ADA’s legislative 
history provides little insight into the intended meaning or scope of the 
term ‘medical examination,’” the court looked to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) published Enforcement Guidance to 
“clarify the terms of 12112(d)(4).”  Id. at 815–16.  The court reviewed 
the seven factors that the EEOC provides for determining whether a test 
or procedure qualifies under the statute, noting that the third factor, 
“whether the psychological counseling was designed to reveal a mental-
health impartment,” constitutes “arguably the most critical [factor] in the 
analysis.”  Id. at 816–20. 
CONCLUSION: Having provided the relevant test for determining 
whether psychological counseling constitutes a “medical examination” 
under the ADA, the 6th Circuit concluded that a defendant may still 
prevail “if such counseling was ‘job related’ and consistent with 
‘business necessity.’”  Id. at 820. 
 
Mehanna v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 677 
F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) removed the 6th 
Circuit’s jurisdiction to review the Secretary of Homeland Security’s 
decision under § 1155 to revoke a visa petition as an act of discretion.  
Id. at 314. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit looked to the plain language of  §1155 
and determined that the use of the word “may” suggests discretion given 
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to the Secretary to revoke a visa.  Id. at 315.  The court then noted that 
the language, “the Secretary may revoke a visa petition ‘at any time,’ [is] 
a phrase that also suggests discretion.”  Id.  In addition, the court referred 
to the language in § 1155 that allows “revocation ‘for what [the 
Secretary] deems to be good and sufficient cause,’” and analyzed the 
word “deem” to mean “the statute leaves it to the Secretary’s opinion, 
judgment, or thought . . . to revoke a petition.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “the Secretary’s decision to 
revoke a visa petition under section 1155 is an act of discretion that 
Congress has removed from [the court’s] review.”  Id. 
 
North Fork Coal Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission, 691 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “the [Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977] 
mandates that an employee’s temporary reinstatement continue after the 
Secretary [of Labor] determines that his complaint lacks merit.”  Id. at 
*2. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted the dispute over the phrase “pending 
final order on the complaint” contained in 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2), the 
statute permitting a miner to file a complaint alleging employment 
discrimination.  Id. at *8.  The Secretary interpreted “complaint” as 
referring to the miner’s underlying discrimination claim litigated either 
by the Secretary under 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) or the miner under 30 
U.S.C. § 815(c)(3).  Id.  The employer interpreted “complaint” as 
referring to the action filed by the Secretary before the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission.  Id. at *9.  The court found the 
phrase did not have a plain meaning.  Id. at *9–10.  Although the 
Secretary was entitled to deference in her interpretation, the court 
reasoned that the Secretary’s interpretation had been offered in litigation 
and therefore should receive only Skidmore deference.  Id. at *16.  The 
court determined that, for reasons of statutory construction and 
legislative history, the Secretary’s interpretation did not have the “power 
to persuade.”  Id. at *21. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “upon the Secretary’s 
determination that discrimination in violation of the Mine Act has not 
occurred, a miner is no longer entitled to temporary reinstatement.”  Id. 
at *22. 
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Shelter Distribution, Inc. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen & 
Helpers Local Union No. 89, 674 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “it is a violation of public policy for a union 
to indemnify an employer for any contingent liability to a pension plan 
established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
[ERISA] . . . as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1461.”  Id. at 609. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he relevant public policy is 
derived by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 
general considerations of supposed public interests.”  Id. at 611 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The court explained that “the Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act was enacted to correct deficiencies in 
ERISA and to provide even more security to employee retirement plans.”  
Id. at 612.  The court then reasoned that ERISA would have been 
amended had “Congress thought that an employer should not be able to 
contractually obligate a third party to indemnify it for any financial 
responsibility incurred under ERISA.”  Id.  The court observed that 
“there is no logical difference between contracting with an insurance 
company . . . and negotiating an indemnification provision.”  Id. at 613.  
The court finally noted that “although the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act sought to minimize the financial burden to a retirement 
plan when an employer withdrew from a multiemployer plan, and 
ERISA was designed to protect the pension benefits of employees, these 
goals still will be served even if indemnification agreements between 
employers and third parties are allowed, as long as the employer remains 
primarily liable.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “collective bargaining 
agreement [did] not violate public policy.”  Id. 
 
Taylor v. KeyCorp, 680 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the court can consider a motion to intervene 
that is filed before the notice of appeal.  Id. at 616. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a notice of appeal divests the 
district court of jurisdiction to resolve a motion to intervene filed after a 
notice of appeal.”  Id.  The court found the 7th Circuit’s reasoning 
persuasive when they stated “that a timely post-judgment motion to 
intervene may not always be resolved before a notice of appeal is due” 
but that “one seeking to intervene is not without recourse.”  Id.  The 
court further noted that one seeking to intervene can filing an emergency 
motion with the district court, or the district court may extend the time 
for filing an appeal.  Id.  The court reasoned that the 2nd, 5th, and 7th 
Circuits were correct in determining that the court should not consider a 
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motion to intervene when the court has not ruled on that motion prior to 
the filing of an appeal.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the district court is 
divested of jurisdiction to rule on a motion to intervene once a notice of 
appeal is filed, even if one files the motion to intervene before the notice 
of appeal.  Id. at 617. 
 
United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) should be interpreted to 
criminalize threats that are unlawful or wrongful.  Id. at 284. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the 2nd Circuit’s prior reasoning 
that a wrongfulness requirement was implicit in 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) by 
analyzing the structure and substance of 18 U.S.C. § 875 as a whole, the 
ordinary meaning of extortion, and 18 U.S.C. § 875(d)’s legislative 
history.  Id.  The 2nd Circuit reasoned that “each of the various 
subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 875 criminalizes conduct that plainly is 
inherently wrongful.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 2nd 
Circuit posited that the Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of extort and 
the Hobbs Act’s definition of extortion support the position that § 875(d) 
criminalizes wrongful threats.  Id. at 285.  The 2nd Circuit stated that 
“there is strong evidence to suggest that Congress intended extortion to 
mean the same thing in 18 U.S.C. § 875 as it does in the Hobbs Act.”  Id.  
The court stated that “to require a threat to be unlawful would be to 
require that the prosecution demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the threat in question was independently illegal in either the criminal or 
civil sense, [and there is] no reason, nor any historical or statutory basis, 
for reading such a requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 875(d).”  Id. at 286–87.  
The court added that “the hallmark of extortion, and its attendant 
complexities, is that it often criminalizes conduct that is otherwise 
lawful.”  Id. at 287. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “that 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) should 
be interpreted to criminalize only threats that are wrongful.”  Id. at 284 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
United States v. Felts, (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an offender can “be convicted for failure to 
register under [the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA)] if his home state . . . has not yet completely implemented the 
act [sic].”  Id. at 602 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, for sex offenders, “the duty to 
register in a state registry is independent of a state’s degree of 
implementation of SORNA.”  Id. at 603.  The court noted that “no state’s 
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registry was in compliance with SORNA” at the time of its enactment in 
2006.  Id. at 604.  The court reasoned that if a state was required to “fully 
implement” SORNA before an offender could be convicted for failing to 
register, then Congress, which provided the states with three years to 
comply without penalty, “would have effectively rendered SORNA 
nugatory in any non-compliant state until 2009.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that the “duty of an offender to 
register is independent of whether or not the state has implemented 
SORNA.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Kearney, 675 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a prior state conviction can qualify as a 
predicate “violent felony” under [the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)] if the offense was enhanced pursuant to a state recidivism 
provision.”  Id. at 575. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s guidance 
in United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) regarding this issue.  
Id. at 575.  The 6th Circuit first noted that the language of the statute was 
unambiguous.  Id. at 576.  Next, the court pointed out “Congress’ intent 
to define a predicate offense with reference to underlying enhancements 
is clear and there is no compelling justification to interpret ACCA out of 
step with other sentencing enhancements.”  Id.  Lastly, the court 
reasoned that referencing “underlying enhancements when evaluating 
whether a predicate offense meets ACCA’s violent felony definition[]” 
best expressed the plain language of the ACCA, comported with its 
understanding of the statute’s legislative intent, and promoted 
consistency with the serious drug offense provision.  Id. at 577. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a prior state conviction 
that had been enhanced pursuant to a state recidivism provision could 
qualify as a predicate “violent felony” under the ACCA.  Id. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
ADT Security Services v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District, (8th 
Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the Illinois Fire Protection District Act 
(IFPDA), a local fire district has the authority “to require (1) that fire 
alarm systems in the district direct-connect to a central monitoring 
facility operated by the District or its authorized agent; (2) that such 
connections be established by wireless radio technology; and (3) that all 
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account holders rely exclusively on the District and its chosen vendor for 
providing alarm equipment and monitoring services.”  Id. at 498. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that fire districts have no inherent 
power, but must instead derive specific powers from the IFPDA.   Id. at 
498–99.  The court evaluated the direct-connect and wireless 
requirements, and found that such requirements are in line with national 
standards and are within the plain meaning of the IFPDA.  Id. at 500–02.   
The court found that the language of the statute does not grant the fire 
district the power “to establish a monopoly over alarm transmitters and 
monitoring services.”  Id. at 499. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that, while the powers granted 
are not broad enough to allow the Fire District to be the exclusive 
provider of the necessary services and devices, the IFPDA does authorize 
the requirement for buildings “to be equipped with wireless alarm 
signaling devices that communicate directly with the District’s board.”  
Id. 
 
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 
686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether rejection of a contract under § 365(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code terminates a licensee’s right to use the intellectual 
property.  Id. at 3–4. 
ANALYSIS: The court discussed a case cited in support of the 
proposition that a licensee’s right to use intellectual property is 
terminated upon rejection of the intellectual property license in 
bankruptcy.  Id. at 3–4.  The court explains that the subsequent addition 
of § 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, which “allows licensees to continue 
using the intellectual property after rejection, provided they meet certain 
conditions,” calls the aforementioned conclusion into question.  Id. at 4.  
“Intellectual property,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, refers to 
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, but makes no mention of 
trademarks.  This omission led the court to conclude that § 365(n) has no 
effect on trademarks.  Id.   The court then examined § 365(g) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which classifies rejection as a breach of contract, and 
explained that “what § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is 
establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights 
remain in place.”  Id. at 9.  Finally, the court clarified that rejection is not 
synonymous with rescission, explaining that rejection relieves the estate 
of the obligation to perform but does not make a contract void.  Id. at 10–
11. 
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CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the rejection of contract 
under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not terminate a licensee’s 
contractual rights to use intellectual property.  Id. at 11. 
 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 686 F.3d 874 (8th 
Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “Whether the collateral order doctrine supports 
jurisdiction for an appeal from a denial of a summary judgment motion 
to consolidate claims.”  Id. at 877. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[j]urisdiction is proper under 
that doctrine if the order appealed from (1) conclusively determines the 
disputed issue; (2) which is an important issue completely separate from 
the merits; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that 
the Supreme Court has stressed that this “narrow” exception should “stay 
that way” and that a party “is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred 
until final judgment has been entered.”  Id.  The court then stated that 
“the denial of a motion to consolidate arbitrations does not imperil a 
substantial public interest sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the 
collateral order doctrine.”  Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that under the collateral order 
doctrine, there was no jurisdiction for appeal from the denial of a 
summary judgment motion to consolidate claims for arbitration.  Id. 
 
Pattison Sand Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission, 688 F.3d 507 (8th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission “possesses authority to modify a § 103(k) order apart from 
the Act’s temporary relief provision.”  Id. at 515. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[t]he Act is silent regarding the 
Commission’s ability to review § 103(k) orders, but its power to conduct 
such review has been recognized by judicial decisions analyzing the 
Act’s structure and legislative history.”  Id.  The 8th Circuit pointed out 
that “the Secretary [of Labor] does not challenge the Commission’s 
ability to review § 103(k) orders and affirm or vacate them.”  Id. at 516.  
The court stated that it “can discern no limiting principle that would 
allow Commission review of § 103(k) orders but prohibit modification of 
such orders.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “the [Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission] has the power to modify § 103(k) 
orders.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Bynum, 669 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “an offer to sell a controlled substance 
categorically ‘involves’ distribution of a controlled substance within the 
meaning of the [Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)].”  Id. at 885. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “mere agreement to distribute a 
controlled substance, even absent some overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, is sufficient to violate federal drug conspiracy laws.”  Id. at 
887.  The court rejected the notion that “drug distribution within the 
meaning of the ACCA depends on whether the offense requires an offer 
to exchange the drugs for value as opposed to an offer to distribute them 
gratuitously.”  Id.  The court further determined that “both conspiracy 
and attempt to distribute controlled substances are serious drug offenses 
under the ACCA.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that an offer to sell and an 
actual sale of drugs are both “serious drug offenses within the meaning 
of the AACA” and that both involve the distribution of drugs within the 
meaning of the ACCA.  Id. at 887–88. 
 
United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “or not, to adopt a ‘dangerous patient’ 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient [testimonial] privilege.”  Id. at 
779. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that other circuits have applied a 
“dangerous patient” exception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, where “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others 
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.”  Id. 
at 784.  The court reasoned that if there were such an exception, 
justified by “the standard of care exercised by a treating 
psychotherapist in complying with a state’s duty to protect 
requirement”, then the “scope of this federal testimonial privilege 
would vary depending upon state determinations of what 
constitutes reasonable professional conduct.”  Id. at 785.  The court 
further reasoned that “adopting [this exception] would necessarily 
have a deleterious effect on the confidence and trust the Supreme 
Court held is implicit in the confidential relationship between the 
therapist and a patient.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 9th 
Circuits, holding that there is no “dangerous patient exception to 
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the federal psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege” to allow a 
“therapist [to] testify at his patient’s own involuntary commitment 
proceedings” when “a patient properly asserts the . . . privilege.”  
Id. at 785-86. 
 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
Alderson v. United States, 686 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether, for tax purposes, a False Claims Act qui tam 
award may be characterized as capital gains rather than ordinary income.  
Id. at 795. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Internal Revenue Code defines 
“capital gain” as “gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.”  Id.  
The court then sought to determine the required elements of “sale or 
exchange” and “capital asset.”  Id.  Beginning with “sale or exchange,” 
the court found the requirement that an appellant provide information to 
the government was a “precondition for pursuing [a] qui tam suit,” and 
that it was unlikely that the government would have accepted an offer 
from an appellant to sell the information.  Id.  Therefore, an appellant 
who did not provide the information as part of a “sale or exchange,” 
especially since Appellant went far beyond merely handing over the 
information by performing “numerous acts” to facilitate the qui tam 
suit’s success.  Id. at 796.   In defining a “capital asset,” the court found 
that the information Appellant provided to the government was not 
Appellant’s property, as Appellant had no “legal right” to maintain 
“exclusive possession or control” over that information.  Id. at 796–97.  
The court was also not convinced that a relator’s award sufficiently 
counted as property to make it a capital investment since Appellant’s 
incurring of expenses—a consequence of generating ordinary income as 
well—did not constitute an “investment of capital.”  Id. at 797.  Finally, 
the court did not view the increase in value of Appellant’s relator’s share 
as an “accretion in value” since Appellant did not “buy and hold the 
relator’s award” during the time in question but was instead working on 
the case to obtain it.  Id. at 798. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a qui tam award won under 
the False Claims Act was ordinary income rather than capital gains.  Id. 
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Bagdasarian Productions, LLC v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
673 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an order compelling enforcement of a 
contractual agreement to submit a dispute to a referee, and staying 
proceedings in the interim, is immediately appealable.”  Id. at 1268. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that it has jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.  Id. at 1270.  The 
court will, in limited circumstances, permit immediate appeal if a “stay 
order puts the plaintiff ‘out of court’—creating a substantial possibility 
there will be no further proceedings in the federal forum, because a 
parallel proceeding might moot the action or become res judicata on the 
operative question.”  Id. at 1270–71.  The court was unconvinced that a 
plaintiff would be put “out of court” as a result of a non-jury proceeding 
before a referee, as the decision of the referee would be reviewable as if 
made by a court.  Id. at 1271.  The court, therefore, declined to treat the 
stay pending the referee proceedings as a final decision subject to 
immediate appeal.  Id. at 1272.  Further, the collateral order doctrine 
failed to provide an avenue for immediate appeal of the stay order for the 
same reason; namely, the requirement that the order be “effectively 
unreviewable” was not met.  Id.  Finally, the court pointed out that stays 
pending arbitration and stays pending reference are similar, and should 
therefore be treated similarly.  Id. at 1273. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a district court’s order 
compelling referee proceedings is not final and does not put a plaintiff 
“out of court.”  Id.  Thus, an immediate interlocutory appeal was 
premature and the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.  Id. at 1273–
74. 
 
C.O. v. Portland Public Schools, 679 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). 
QUESTION: Whether “a party may bring a damages action based 
upon the admissions policies of a magnet school.”  Id. at 1169. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the requirements of § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act merely requires an educational institution to not 
exclude an “otherwise qualified” person based on his or her disability 
rather than requiring that it disregard a disability or make substantial 
program modifications to allow a disabled person to participate.  Id.  The 
court further noted that it “extends judicial deference to a school’s 
academic decisions in [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] and 
Rehabilitation Act cases.”  Id.  The court reasoned that reading this 
provision in the context of Congress’ other education policies shows that 
“Congress did not intend to provide a private cause of action for 
monetary damages based on such a claim.”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a party may not bring a 
damages action against a magnet school based upon its admissions 
policies, absent any further indication of congressional intent.  Id. at 
1170. 
 
Drew v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, No. 11-15008, 2012 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 16378 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether an individual’s direct complaint to a bank, 
unaccompanied by a credit reporting agency’s (CRA) notification of 
dispute, will trigger the bank’s duties to “investigate and correct 
erroneous information” under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) or the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FRCA).  Id. at *1, 8. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that under subsection b, a “direct 
complaint . . . [does] not trigger[] any duty . . . [when] unaccompanied by 
CRA notification.”  Id. at *9.  The court noted, however, that when a 
credit agency furnishes a letter regarding a fraudulent account 
application, then this letter provides sufficient notice to the bank under 
the statute to trigger the bank’s duties to investigate the erroneous 
information.  Id. at *10–11. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “although [a client’s] 
communication with [his bank] ha[s] no statutory impact, [a CRA’s later] 
notification [is] . . . sufficient to trigger [the bank’s] duties under the 
FRCA.”  Id. at *11. 
 
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the 2004 Amendment to California’s DNA 
and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 (DNA 
Act), which requires all adult felony arrestees to provide DNA samples 
to law enforcement officers, violates the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
1050. 
ANALYSIS: The court evaluated the constitutionality of the 
Amendment by using the totality of the circumstances test, by 
“‘balancing the arrestees’ privacy interests against the Government’s 
need for the DNA samples.”  Id.  The court further noted that the actual 
intrusion to personal privacy involved is not that significant and that 
arrestees have limited expectations of privacy.  Id. at 1058–60.  The 
court reasoned that the benefit that law enforcement receives from the 
DNA, however, is substantial.  Id. at 1062-64. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the government’s interest 
in collecting DNA from felony arrestees outweighs the privacy concerns 
of those arrested, and therefore the Amendment to the DNA Act does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 1051. 
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Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication Inc. v. Director, 687 F.3d 1182 (9th 
Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether, for purposes of apportioning liability in a 
disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act, “an employee who has a permanent partial disability 
may be reclassified as temporarily totally disabled during a recovery 
period following surgery.”  Id. at 1183. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “a condition deemed permanent is 
not immutably so” and further noted that “[n]othing in the Longshore 
Act limits re-characterizations to a one-way street from temporary to 
permanent; instead, the statute’s broad thoroughfare allows for two-way 
traffic.”  Id. at 1186.  The court found that no matter how an injury is 
characterized at its outset, a disability may be temporary “so long as 
there [is] a possibility or likelihood of improvement through normal and 
natural healing.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court noted 
that “even though a permanent disability itself persists through periods of 
temporary exacerbation, an award for temporary total disability will 
subsume an award for a permanent partial disability stemming from the 
same injury because a total disability presupposes the loss of all wage-
earning capacity.”  Id. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court then reasoned that “a prior finding of partial permanent disability 
does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same 
underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery.”  Id. at 
1187–88.  Therefore, the court found that an employer is held 
responsible for temporary total disability payments when a claimant’s 
partial permanent disability is re-characterized as a temporary total 
disability.  Id. at 1188. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an employee’s partial 
permanent disability “may properly be re-characterized as a 
temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances . . 
. .” Id. 
 
Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), § 212(c) waiver of removal “is 
available to aliens who proceeded to trial if they can plausibly argue that 
they relied on the availability of relief” prior to the Act’s repeal.  Id. at 
1256. 
ANALYSIS: The court first distinguished the instant case from 
others, noting that the alien had “not been charged with or convicted of 
an aggravated felony,” but rather a crime of moral turpitude.  Id.  The 
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court then observed that a guilty plea or guilty verdict “would not have 
disqualified [the alien] from eligibility to apply for § 212(c) relief, 
because only aliens who (1) were convicted of an aggravated felony and 
(2) served more than five years were disqualified from § 212(c) relief.”  
Id. at 1256–57. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that an alien charged with a 
crime of moral turpitude may apply for § 212(c) waiver of removal under 
IIRIRA.  Id. at 1257. 
 
 
In re Tober, 688 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a debtor’s named beneficiary is required to be 
a “dependent” in order to qualify for an exemption under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann.§ 33-1126(A)(6) and (7).  Id. at 1161. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that for the exemption to apply, 
the term “other” in the statute must operate as a word of differentiation 
so “that an individual can either be exempted as a listed family member 
(who need not be dependent) or as any ‘other’ family member who is 
dependent.”  Id. at 1162.  The court reasoned that “[i]f the legislature had 
wanted only dependent family members to be exempted, then the 
legislature could have exempted ‘dependent family members,’ rather 
than list certain close family members and exempt other dependent 
family members.”  Id.  The court also noted that the term “other” in the 
statute is ambiguous and “where the text of a statutory exemption is 
ambiguous as to whether it applies, the debtor is entitled to the 
exemption.”  Id. at 1163. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the statutory text does not 
require a debtor’s beneficiary to be a “dependent” to qualify for an 
exemption.  Id. 
 
United States v. Goodbear, 676 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “use of a minor can be attributed to another 
for the purposes of applying an enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.4 
for a misprision of felony offense . . . .”  Id. at 905. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “whether the two-level 
enhancement under § 3.B1.4 is appropriate . . . is driven by the plain 
language of § 2X4.1 and its commentary.”  Id. at 910.  The court stated 
that the “[g]uidelines and their commentary . . . instruct the court to 
determine the offense level for the underlying offense exactly as it would 
have had the defendant been convicted of that offense, and from there, to 
apply the misprision guideline provision.”  Id. at 911.  The court further 
reasoned that “Application Note 1 to § 2X4.1 directs the court to apply 
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the base offense level plus any applicable specific offense characteristics 
that were known, or reasonably should have been known, by the 
defendant.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the use of a minor can be 
attributed to another for misprision of felony offense.”  Id. at 910. 
 
United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a command to “empty one’s pockets” 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search when the party at whom the 
command is directed has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his pockets and “does not comply with the command.”  Id. at 
1081. 
ANALYSIS: Citing 9th Circuit precedent, the court reasoned that a 
Fourth Amendment search occurs when police order a person to reveal 
something in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the 
item is actually revealed.  Id. at 1082.  The court distinguished the facts 
at bar from those at issue in the earlier 9th Circuit decision, and reasoned 
that the search in the earlier case was “substantially contemporaneous 
with the arrest,” whereas, in the present case, “probable cause to arrest 
[the criminal defendant] did not exist prior to the initial command” to 
empty his pockets.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, by itself, a command to 
empty one’s pockets before compliance, does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search.  Id. 
 
United States v. Suarez, 682 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a guilty plea to a felony drug charge, which 
was at no point appealable and was dismissed without entry of judgment, 
qualifies as a prior conviction that has become “final” under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(A).  Id. at 1221. 
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the meaning of the word “final” in 
the sentencing context.  Id.  The court noted that legislative history did 
not assist in interpreting the meaning of the phrase “has become final” in 
§ 841(b)(1)(A).  Id.  The court then noted that two factually similar cases 
from the 1st and 8th Circuits did not directly address or resolve the 
finality issue before the court and instead focused on whether the 
suspended sentences were “prior convictions.”  Id. at 1221–22.  The 
court pointed out that it had recognized “that the finality requirement in § 
841(b)(1)(A) likely reflects a temporal concern, rather than a substantive 
one.”  Id. at 1222.  The court then noted that “a legally cognizable 
sentence that was never subject to appeal under state law could still 
constitute a final prior conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A).”  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “in order to qualify as a 
final prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a guilty plea must 
either: (1) ripen into a final judgment; or (2) result in a legally cognizable 
sentence.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Turner, 689 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “Whether a civil detention under the [Walsh] Act 
constitutes a term of imprisonment that both precludes and tolls the 
commencement of a supervised release term of a sex offender who has 
completed his incarceration for a criminal conviction.”  Id. at 1118. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Walsh Act’s “stay-of-release 
provision relates to all of the procedures and proceedings in a 
comprehensive civil commitment statute.”  Id. at 1122.  The court 
reasoned that “civil commitment procedures commence with the 
government’s initial certification[,] . . . continue through the civil 
commitment hearing and, for a committed individual, are not completed 
until a court determines by a preponderance of evidence that the 
individual is no longer a ‘sexually dangerous person’ and may be 
discharged.”  Id.  The court further noted that “custody of the Bureau of 
Prisons does not determine whether someone is imprisoned.”  Id. at 
1124.  Rather, the courts must examine the nature of the custody, and 
detention pending the outcome of a civil commitment hearing does not 
amount to “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction.”  Id. at 
1124–25. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a term of supervised 
release does not toll during the civil detention of a person who is 
awaiting the outcome of a civil commitment hearing pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 4248.  Id. at 1125. 
 
United States v. Wing, 682 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, a district court 
has jurisdiction to revoke a future term of supervised release based upon 
newly discovered violations of conditions of a past term of supervised 
release.”  Id. at 864. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that Congress established a 
structure of separate terms of supervised release in § 3583.  Id. at 868.  
Despite recognizing that the relevant clause in § 3583(e)(3) is ambiguous 
when read by itself, the court reasoned that Congress’ use of the term 
“revoke” was in the ordinary sense, since any other interpretation would 
lead to a result unintended by Congress.  Id. at 867–68.  The court went 
on to note that the Guidelines Manuel, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1, sentencing 
scheme for violations of supervised release supported its interpretation of 
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§ 3583(e)(3).  Id. at 871–72.  Finally, the court dispelled public policy 
concerns, noting that “district courts have tools to safeguard against the 
release of defendants who may pose a danger to the public . . . and the 
power to penalize defendants who abuse the court’s trust during release.”  
Id. at 873. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) 
requires “that the court find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of the term of supervised release that is 
being revoked.”  Id. at 874. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel extends to an Atkins proceeding.  Id. at 1183. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
to effective counsel is implicit within the principle that the “Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies as fully to an Atkins 
proceeding as to any other jury trial.”  Id.  The court reasoned that an 
Atkins trial is “inextricably intertwined” with sentencing and essentially 
determines whether the State has the power to take his life.  Id. at 1184.  
The court further reasoned that “a mentally retarded defendant [who] has 
a right not to be executed by the state [should also have] a right to 
counsel in proceedings where the question of mental retardation will be 
determined . . . .”  Id. at 1184–85. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that a defendant in an Atkins 
proceeding, “ill equipped to represent [himself]”, has a right to effective 
counsel pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, where a post-
conviction Atkins proceeding is the “first designated proceeding” at 
which he could raise a claim of mental retardation.  Id. at 1183. 
 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Chao Lin v. United States Attorney General, 677 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a court may be considered inaccessible within 
the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. § 26(a)(1) when the clerk’s office is open 
for business.  Id. at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “official closure of the clerk’s 
office for any reason makes that office inaccessible.”  Id.  The court 
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stated that evidence of inclement weather or lack of internet access could 
be offered as standards of inaccessibility.  Id.  The court agreed with the 
2nd, 6th, and 9th Circuit’s reasoning that “total closure may be necessary 
to extend the time for filing.”  Id. at 1046. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that when a clerk’s office is 
open, it is not considered inaccessible within the meaning of Fed. R. 
App. P § 26(a)(1), and any petitions due but not filed by that date are 
considered untimely.  Id. 
 
 
Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS 
Forwarding (USA), Inc., 685 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a foreign arbitral panel was a “tribunal” under 
28 U.S.C. § 1782, which permits domestic discovery for use in foreign 
proceedings.  Id. at 994. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the determination of whether a 
foreign arbitration falls within the scope of section 1782 is guided in 
substantial measure by the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Intel 
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004),” to 
construe the term “tribunal” broadly.  Id.  In that case, the Supreme Court 
explained that “Congress introduced the word ‘tribunal’ to ensure that 
assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts, but 
extends also to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.”  Id.  The 
11th Circuit reasoned that the arbitral panel in question “ha[d] the 
authority to receive evidence, resolve the [billing] dispute [between the 
parties], . . . award a binding decision[,] . . . [and] the parties w[ould] be 
able to appeal the decision before an ordinary court of [the foreign 
nation] for cases related to procedural defects during the proceedings . . . 
.” Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).  These designations of 
authority met the “functional criteria” articulated by the Supreme Court.  
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that as a “first-instance 
decisionmaker whose judgment is subject to judicial review,” the foreign 
arbitral panel was a “tribunal” for purposes of § 1782.  Id. at 997. 
 
Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the holding in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), requires “that an absent class member be 
afforded an opportunity to exclude herself from a limited fund class 
settlement.”  Id. at 1330. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the “opt-out requirement in Shutts 
addressed the class action court’s jurisdiction over absent class members 
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without minimum contacts with the forum” and that “established law 
holds that a court with jurisdiction over a res or fund also has jurisdiction 
over all claims against that fund.”  Id. at 1333.  The court posited that 
“the presence within the jurisdiction of a res or fund that is the subject of 
the litigation resolves the personal jurisdiction objection of absent 
claimants” in a limited fund class action.  Id. at 1331. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a limited fund recovery, 
prior to class certification, creates a sufficient basis for a court’s 
jurisdiction over the claimants to the fund, regardless of their location.  
Id. at 1332. 
 
Lyashchynska v.United States Attorney General, 676 F.3d 962 (11th 
Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Investigator conducting the investigation 
of Petitioner’s alleged abuse in the [foreign country] failed to comply 
with the confidentiality requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6, which 
generally prohibits disclosing information submitted in an asylum 
application unless the applicant gives written consent.”  Id. at 967. 
ANALYSIS: First, the 11th Circuit noted that courts usually give 
government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy 
with respect to the confidentiality requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a).  
Id. at 970.  The court referred to decisions of the 2nd and 8th Circuits, 
which held that disclosure of a foreign national’s name or date of birth 
does not necessarily result in a breach of confidentiality regulations 
because such disclosure may occur independent of an application for 
asylum, providing examples such as on birth certificates or marriage 
licenses.  Id.  To determine whether there was such a breach, the court 
followed the factors used by the 8th Circuit: “a breach occurs when 
information is disclosed to a third party and the disclosure is significant 
enough that it allows the third party to connect the identity of the 
applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant is seeking asylum; (2) specific 
facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim in the 
application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable inference that the person is seeking asylum.”  Id. (internal 
citation omitted).  The 11th Circuit found that no information contained 
in or pertaining to an asylum application was disclosed.  Id.  The court 
noted that “[d]isclosure of a person’s name is not sufficient for a breach 
of confidentiality; indeed without disclosure of a name, investigating 
these claims would be impossible.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the “Petitioner did not 
overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to government 
investigations,” and therefore, the investigation did not breach the 
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confidentiality requirement of 8 C.F.R § 1208.6(a) in the asylum 
application process.  Id. at 971. 
 
Solutia Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “parties subject to a consent decree may file 
claims for cost recovery under § 107(a) of [the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)], 
or whether their remedies are limited to filing claims for contribution 
under § 113(f) of CERCLA.”  Id. at 1233. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[w]hether § 107(a) . . . grants 
parties a right to recover cleanup costs that they directly incur in 
complying with a consent decree is a matter of statutory interpretation . . 
. .”  Id. at 1235.  The court noted that the Supreme Court recently held in 
two decisions that each of the CERCLA provisions at issue in this case 
provide private parties with a right of action to recover costs.  Id.  The 
11th Circuit had previously held that a consent decree gives a private 
party the right to contribution pursuant to § 113(f), but the court had not 
previously addressed whether this was the sole recovery mechanism 
available.  Id. at 1236.   The court reasoned that “[i]f a party subject to a 
consent decree could simply repackage its § 113(f) claim for contribution 
as one for recovery under § 107(a), then the structure of CERCLA 
remedies would be completely undermined.”  Id. at 1236.  The court 
further noted that “parties could circumvent the different statutes of 
limitations[,] thwart the contribution protection afforded to parties that 
settle their liability with the EPA[,]” and parties subject to a consent 
decree could further impose joint and several liability against similarly 
situated parties who would then be barred from asserting counterclaims 
under § 113(f).  Id. at 1236–37. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that there is no § 107(a) 
remedy granted to parties to recover cleanup costs they incurred as a 
result of their compliance with a consent decree.  Id. at 1237. 
 
United States v. Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 673 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether “the United States can sue a State to enforce 
[the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA)] on behalf of a particular veteran.”  Id. at 1325 n.3. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that USERRA gives the federal 
government the right to sue States in federal court to enforce federal law.  
Id. at 1326.  The court reasoned that the United States, not the individual, 
has “control over prosecution of the case” and that “the United States has 
an independent interest in enforcing USERRA.”  Id. at 1327.  The court 
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also noted that the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits have “rejected States’ 
contentions that lawsuits brought by the United States on behalf of 
specific victims are simply private lawsuits.”  Id. at 1328. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity does not bar suit since “the United States has a clear 
and substantial interest in enforcing USERRA.”  Id. 
 
United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) 
requires the government to prove that the defendant knew that the victim 
was a minor.”  Id. at 1240. 
ANALYSIS: The court distinguished section 2422(b) from 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028(a)(1), an aggravated identity theft statute that requires that the 
defendant had specific knowledge that the “means of identification” he 
or she was using belonged to someone else.  Id. at 1248.  The court noted 
that while the two statutes were grammatically similar, the intent behind 
the statutes differed.  Id.  In writing section 2422(b), Congress sought to 
protect minors rather than victims of identity theft.  Id.  This “special 
context” called for a contextual approach to statutory interpretation.  Id.  
Consistent with this approach, the court declined to require knowledge 
that the victim was a minor, as this interpretation offered more 
protection.  Id.  The court also noted that other courts did not apply this 
knowledge requirement to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) because protections of 
minors rebut the general presumption that a knowing mens rea applies to 
every element in the statute.  Id. at 1248–49.  Due to the similarities 
between sections 2422(b) and 2423(a), the court interpreted section 
2422(b) accordingly.  Id. at 1248 n.14. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that § 2422(b) does not 
require that a defendant know that the victim was a minor.  Id. at 1248. 
 
United States v. Haile, 685 F. 3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the imposition of enhanced penalties 
following a conviction for gun possession under 18 U.S.C § 922(k) 
requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knew at the time he possessed the gun that the serial number 
was obliterated.  Id. at 1220. 
ANALYSIS: The court acknowledged that “other circuits have 
consistently held that knowledge of the obliterated serial number is an 
element of the offense.”  Id.  The court further noted that § 924(a)(1)(B), 
the statutory provision governing penalties for violations of § 924(k), 
“applies only to ‘knowing’ violations.”  Id.  The court reasoned that [the] 
knowledge [element of § 922(k)] can be demonstrated by direct evidence 
126 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:44 
of actual knowledge or “may be inferred when the defendant has 
possessed the gun under conditions which an ordinary man would have 
inspected it and discovered the absence of a serial number.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The Eleventh Circuit joined its sister circuits “in 
holding that a defendant’s knowledge of the obliterated serial number is 
an element of the § 922(k) offense.”  Id. at 1220. 
 
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether the “United States has jurisdiction to 
prosecute a nominated surveyor . . . for knowingly violating the 
[International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL)], while aboard a foreign vessel docked in the United States.”  
Id. at 1141. 
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized that “district courts have 
original jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United 
States.”  Id. at 1145.  The court then observed that Congress created two 
express limitations to the application of the MARPOL, when it 
implemented the treaty under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships 
(APPS), 33 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.  Id.  The court went on to note that the 
second limitation requires that any action taken by the United States 
under APPS must be taken in accordance with well-established 
international law.  Id.  The court explained that Article 4 of the 
MARPOL states that “for violations that occur within the jurisdiction of 
the Port State, the Port State and the Flag State have concurrent 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 1146.  The court further explained that by signing the 
MARPOL treaty, the United States “consented to surrender its exclusive 
jurisdiction over violations within its ports, but maintains concurrent 
jurisdiction to sanction violations of the treaty according to U.S. law.”  
Id.  The court did not find the United States either expressly or impliedly 
consented to surrender its concurrent jurisdiction over violations of the 
APPS occurring on foreign ships while docked at U.S. ports, in Article 4 
or the APPS.  Id. at 1147.  The court concluded that “18 U.S.C. § 3231 
and 33 U.S.C. §§ 1907 and 1908 give U.S. district courts jurisdiction 
over violations of MARPOL committed on foreign-flagged ships in U.S. 
ports.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the “United States had 
jurisdiction to prosecute a surveyor of a foreign-flagged ship for a 
knowing violation of MARPOL committed on a foreign-flagged ship at a 
U.S. port.”  Id. 
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Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18163 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 27, 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether debt collectors’ “settlement offers for the full 
amount of statutory damages requested under the [Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA)] rendered claims moot, requiring their dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).”  Id. at 1166. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[o]ffers for the full relief 
requested have been found to moot a claim,” and highlighted that full 
relief means “the full amount of statutory damages plus a judgment.”  Id. 
at 1166–67.  The court agreed with the 4th Circuit that a settlement offer 
is not full relief and that an offer of judgment against defendants is 
preferable for a plaintiff because a court may enforce a judgment.  Id. at 
1167  Therefore, the 11th Circuit reasoned that, because the relief offered 
by the settlement offer was incomplete, “a live controversy remained 
over the issue of a judgment and the cases were not moot.”  Id. at 1167–
68.    
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the debt collector’s 
failure “to offer judgment prevented the mooting of FDCPA claims.”  Id. 
at 1168. 
 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) 
QUESTION: Whether Treasury Regulation § 1.263A-
11(e)(1)(ii)(B), which “sets out the general rule that when improving real 
property, certain costs must be capitalized instead of deducted from 
taxable income,” can validly be applied to interest incurred on debt that 
is unrelated to capital improvements being made to the real property.  Id. 
at 1314. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit analyzed the validity of § 1.263A–
11(e)(1)(ii)(B) under the two-step test set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), 
first determining whether the interpreted statute directly addresses the 
question at issue.  Id. at 1317.  If the statute does not address the 
question, then agency’s answer to that question is determined based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.  Id.  The court agreed with the 
finding of the United States Court of Federal Claims that § 1.263A–
11(e)(1)(ii)(B) does not contradict the text of I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii), 
because the statute is circular in its elucidation of the amount of interest 
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to be capitalized.  Id.  The Federal Circuit found that § 1.263A–
11(e)(1)(ii)(B) was not a reasonable interpretation of the “avoided-cost 
rule” set forth in I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii) because the regulation 
defined “production expenditures” as including the adjusted basis of the 
designated property.  Id.  The court explained that the “avoided-cost 
rule,” as noted in the statute’s legislative history, recognizes that if a 
capital improvement is not made, those funds can be used to pay down 
outstanding debt on the property, reducing accrued interest.  Id. at 1317–
18.  When a capital improvement is made, the amount of capitalized 
interest should be calculated by multiplying the interest rate by the cost 
of the improvement.  Id.  This calculation should not include the 
property’s adjusted basis as § 1.263A–11(e)(1)(ii)(B) improperly 
instructs, since this amount would not have been available to pay down 
the debt had the improvement not been made.  Id.  Moreover, the 
Treasury’s failure to provide a reasoned explanation for adopting § 
1.263A–11(e)(1)(ii)(B) violated Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), which requires the Treasury to 
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”  Id. at 1319 
(internal quotation marks omitted.) 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the “associated-
property rule” under Treasury Regulation § 1.263A–11(e)(1)(ii)(B) was 
invalid because it misinterpreted I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii) as requiring 
the adjusted basis of property temporarily withdrawn from service due to 
a capital improvement constituting production of designated property to 
be included in the calculation of capitalized interest.  Id. at 1319. 
 
VanDesande v. United States, 673 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
QUESTION: Whether a Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages 
between the Government and a federal employee, “resulting from a 
settlement of an earlier personnel case, is a contract, a consent decree, or 
perhaps both.”  Id. at 1343. 
ANALYSIS: The court cited Supreme Court precedent to support the 
notions that consent decrees and settlement agreements are not mutually 
exclusive as a matter of law, that consent decrees are a hybrid between 
contracts and judicial acts, and that a consent decree is treated as a 
contract or a judicial order depending on the nature of the case.  Id. at 
1348–49.  The court stated that consent decrees are treated as contracts 
for purposes of enforcement, explaining that “the application of contract 
concepts lies at the heart of any claim for enforcement,” due to the 
fundamental inquiry of whether the non-breaching party will receive the 
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benefit of the bargain absent enforcement.  Id. at 1350.  The court also 
pointed out that settlement agreements tend to contain all of the elements 
of a contract, including the very term “agreement.”  Id. at 1351.  The 
court reasoned that since the answer to this issue determined whether it 
had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute under the Tucker Act, 
which confers federal jurisdiction over “claim[s] against the United 
States . . . founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the 
United States,” to hold otherwise would be “inconsistent with the well-
established rule that neither a court nor the parties ha[ve] the power to 
alter a federal court’s statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. 
at 1350. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that consent decrees and 
settlement agreements are not mutually exclusive, and that the stipulation 
agreement was a contract for purposes of enforcement.  Id. at 1350–51. 
  

